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[1] Beneﬁciaries of common pool resources (CPRs) may select available noncooperative

and regulatory exogenous institutions for managing the resource, as well as cooperative
management institutions. All these institutions may increase the long-term gains, prolong
the life of the resource, and help to escape the tragedy of the commons trap. Cooperative
game theory approaches can serve as the backbone of cooperative CPR management
institutions. This paper formulates and applies several commonly used cooperative game
theoretic solution concepts, namely, the core, Nash-Harsanyi, Shapley, and nucleolus.
Through a numerical groundwater example, we show how CPR users can share the gains
obtained from cooperation in a fair and efﬁcient manner based on these cooperative solution
concepts (management institutions). Although, based on their fairness rationales, various
cooperative management institutions may suggest different allocations that are potentially
acceptable to the users, these allocation solutions may not be stable as some users may ﬁnd
them unfair. This paper discusses how different methods, such as application of the plurality
rule and power index, stability index, and propensity to disrupt concepts, can help identify
the most stable and likely solutions for enforcing cooperation among the CPR beneﬁciaries.
Furthermore, how the noncooperative managerial characteristics of the CPR users can affect
the stability and acceptability of the different cooperative CPR management institutions is
discussed, providing valuable policy insights for cooperative CPR management at
community levels.
Citation: Madani, K., and A. Dinar (2012), Cooperative institutions for sustainable common pool resource management: Application
to groundwater, Water Resour. Res., 48, W09553, doi:10.1029/2011WR010849.

1.

Introduction

[2] It is not uncommon in practice to face situations in
which beneﬁciaries are required to reduce uses of a scarce
resource, e.g., ﬁshery [Munro, 2009] and water during a
drought [Zilberman et al., 1998], or reducing production
levels of a public bad. e.g., greenhouse gas emissions
reduction by countries [Cazorla and Toman, 2000], in order
to increase their long-term beneﬁts. The overarching commonality across such situations is the fact that the loss of
immediate beneﬁts and the gain of long-term beneﬁts
should be shared among the beneﬁciaries. In this paper,
various cooperative institutions for management and sharing long-term beneﬁts of common pool resources (CPRs)
are reviewed and the effectiveness of each institution is
explored.
[3] A CPR is deﬁned as a resource system whose yield is
subtractable and its characteristics make the exclusion of
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potential appropriators or limitation of the existing beneﬁciaries’ rights nontrivial, but not necessarily impossible
[Ostrom et al., 1994]. Not only do CPRs include the natural
resources such as water, forests, pastures, oil, gas, ﬁsh, land,
air, etc., but also the human-made resources that provide
service and beneﬁts (e.g., radio frequency spectra, reservoirs, irrigation infrastructure, wastewater treatment facilities, parks, roads, and other public infrastructures).
[4] Early works argued that in a joint usage of CPRs, parties are always driven by immutable logic of more withdrawal from (or less investment in) the CPR than what is
optimal to sustain the system [Gardner et al., 1990]. Scholars
with such a belief expected all CPR users to show noncooperative and competitive behaviors that make the tragedy of
the commons [Gordon, 1954; Hardin, 1968] inevitable. The
argument was that within a CPR dilemma, parties always
base their actions on individual rationality (as opposed to
rational group choices), which negatively affect all users
eventually [Ostrom, 2010]. Within this school of thought,
noncooperative game theory (the prisoner’s dilemma game
and the well-known Nash noncooperative stability deﬁnition
(solution concept) [Nash, 1951]) provided a reasonable
framework for illustrating the individualistic behavior of the
parties to a CPR and exploring the resulting tragic outcomes
[Madani, 2010]. To overcome the tragedy of the commons
and avoid the inferior outcomes, two basic solutions have
been suggested based on the complete rational decision
maker paradigm: external regulations of extraction and
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appropriation of ownership rights [Castillo and Saysel,
2005].
[5] Ostrom [1990] challenged Hardin’s pessimistic tragedy
of the commons hypothesis, suggesting the possibility of existence of cooperative optimal outcomes for CPR problems,
based on extensive ﬁeld studies, real-world evidence, and lab
experiments. Ostrom argued that the tragic outcomes are not
necessarily inevitable for CPR problems, as CPR users do
not always follow Nash strategies [Fehr and Fischbacher,
2002; Ostrom et al., 1994], which are merely based on individual rationality [Ostrom, 1998]. Finding the results of simple one-shot Nash solution-based CPR models and CPR
games with ﬁnite repetitions solved by backward induction
unreliable, Ostrom [1998] recognized the need for expanding
the range of rational choice models to be used as a foundation
for studying social dilemmas and collective actions. In her
view, most previous models had failed to capture the reality
of a decision-making process, which might be affected by
different factors such as communication, trust, learning,
and norms. As discussed by others [Madani and Hipel, 2011;
Selbirak, 1994] the Nash noncooperative solution concept
reﬂects the behavior of a risk-averse myopic player and fails
to predict the accurate outcomes of real conﬂict situations,
due to restricted assumptions underlying models of players’
rationality. Thus, to improve the reliability of noncooperative
CPR models, different modiﬁcations to the conventional noncooperative game theory analyses have been suggested,
including: developing structures other than prisoner’s dilemma for illustrating noncooperative CPR games [Gardner
et al., 1990; Madani, 2010; Sandler, 1992; Taylor, 1987],
introducing uncertainties or incomplete information in the
game [Ostrom, 1998], studying CPR games as inﬁnite
repeated games in which players take mixed strategies
[Ostrom et al., 1994]; deﬁning CPR problems in a dynamic
game context [Negri, 1989]; and analyzing games using noncooperative solution concepts (stability deﬁnitions) other
than the Nash solution concept, which better reﬂect the decision makers’ characteristics and behavior during the decision-making process [Madani and Lund, 2011; Madani and
Hipel, 2011]. The results of the improved game models are
consistent with the ﬁndings of Ostrom [1990] and Ostrom
et al. [1994], which were based on both real cases and lab
experiments. The results suggest that besides external solutions and appropriating exploitation rights to avoid tragic outcomes, the CPR users have the potential of escaping the
resource depletion trap [Castillo and Saysel, 2005] through
developing cooperative institutions and collective actions
that can enforce sustainable exploitation and development of
the resource.
[6] Madani and Dinar [2012] classiﬁed the available
institutions for managing CPRs into three categories, namely
the noncooperative, exogenous regulatory, and cooperative
institutions. Under the noncooperative institutions, beneﬁciaries may either adopt myopic ignorant plans in which the
long-term effects of exploitation plans and the externalities
are ignored, or develop plans that are not myopic and/or
ignorant. Madani and Dinar [2012] show that noncooperative institutions do not necessary result in tragic outcomes.
Rather, sustainable CPRs may be achieved even under these
institutions. Exogenous institutions include interventions by
regulators (e.g., exploitation regulation, ownership rights
assignment, and enforcement of different CPR governing
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rules) to overcome overexploitation of the resources and
achieve sustainable CPRs [Madani and Dinar, 2011]. Under
cooperative institutions, beneﬁciaries can base actions on
group rationality and develop exploitation plans that increase
the long-term gains for all users and provide them with sustainable beneﬁts. Due to complexity of CPR problems and
variability of their conditions, selection of an optimal management institution category (out of the three mentioned categories) that provides maximum beneﬁts and enforces
sustainability is nearly impossible [Madani and Dinar,
2012]. Instead, the optimum CPR management institution
category should be selected considering the speciﬁc conditions of the problem. For instance, even though cooperative
institutions may generally provide the highest beneﬁts to the
users, the complexity of the arrangements [Faysse, 2005]
(e.g., transaction costs) may discourage parties from applying them in a given CPR problem, making these institutions
inferior to the other two sets of institutions in that problem.
Therefore, no speciﬁc CPR management institution has a
strict dominance to other ones and depending on conditions
of a CPR problem and the optimal CPR management institutions category can vary between CPR problems with different characteristics. Nevertheless, an in-depth study of all
classes of CPR management institutions is essential to enable adoption of the most appropriate type of institution,
given the conditions of the problem. Our previous works
provide comprehensive studies of noncooperative CPR management institutions [Madani and Dinar, 2012] as well as
exogenous CPR management institutions [Madani and
Dinar, 2011]. Thus, this paper focuses on the third category
of CPR management institutions, cooperative institutions, to
clarify how they can provide a framework for achieving sustainable CPRs.
[7] In fact, cooperative CPR management institutions provide acceptable solutions, by not only prolonging the CPR’s
lifetime through sustainable and efﬁcient exploitation, but
also by satisfying the beneﬁciaries’ equity concerns. CPRs
can remain sustainable or may be brought back to a sustainable stage through contributions of stakeholders. It is possible to estimate the total required contribution of all parties to
keep the CPR at a sustainable level. However, developing a
fair and efﬁcient scheme for allocating the achieved beneﬁts
among the parties is challenging, as often the CPR beneﬁts
are not equally distributed among the users.
[8] Cooperative game theory provides an appropriate
framework for determining how CPR users can fairly and
efﬁciently beneﬁt from the CPR. However, most researchers have mainly focused on application of noncooperative
game theory in CPR management studies [Faysse, 2005]
and the applications of cooperative game theory concepts
to CPR problems are limited. Dinar et al. [1986] used cooperative game theory solutions to design an efﬁcient regional cooperation over reuse of municipal efﬂuent for
irrigation in a coastal plain region of Israel. Okada and
Mikami [1992] apply cooperative game theory concepts to
a hypothetical example in the U.S. and Canada to design
effective and equitable methods to mitigate the acid rain
problems. Using a water resource project in Southern California as a sample CPR Lejano and Davos [1999] discuss
how cooperative game theory solution concepts for engendering and sustaining the necessary cooperation among the
CPR beneﬁciaries. Lindroos and Kaitala [2000] apply
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cooperative game theory concepts to a ﬁshery problem in
Europe to explore the possibility of cooperation between
the ﬁshing nations. Petrosjan and Zaccour [2003] use cooperative game theory concepts to design a mechanism for
cooperation among countries to reduce pollution or emissions. Zara et al. [2006], Parrachino et al. [2006], and
Madani [2010] provide extensive reviews of applications
of cooperative game theory concepts to natural, environmental, and water resource problems.
[9] While previous cooperative game theory applications
in the CPR management context underline the value of cooperative game theory in designing fair and efﬁcient mechanisms for allocating the beneﬁts of CPRs, most of these
studies ignore the stability and acceptability of the suggested cooperative mechanisms. Furthermore, to our best
knowledge the effects of the noncooperative characteristics
of the players on stability and acceptability of the cooperative solutions have not been explored in existing work.
[10] In this paper, we suggest several cooperative game
theoretic solution methods to be used as cooperative CPR
management institutions for estimation of the fair shares of
the beneﬁciaries when CPR is exploited in a sustainable cooperative fashion. As is the case with many efﬁcient policy
interventions, they are not acceptable to all stakeholders,
leading to derail of the policy. This study pays attention to
such discrepancy and suggests different methods for evaluating the stability and acceptability of cooperative CPR management institutions. The major contribution, of the paper is
in exploring the effects of noncooperative management
behaviors of the CPR users on stability and acceptability of
cooperative CPR management institutions. Knowledge of
such effects can provide valuable insights to policy making
for CPR management. The cooperative solution methods suggested in this study are appropriate for problems in which
parties are willing to improve their foresight level and consider the long-term beneﬁts of cooperation as long-term CPR
planning and management requires reliable information about
the future.
[11] In section 2, various cooperative CPR management
institutions are reviewed and formulated. In section 3, a
groundwater exploitation problem is introduced and modeled.
In section 4, the problem is solved through a social planning
approach and the core of the problem is calculated. Cooperative management institutions are applied to the groundwater
exploitation problem in section 5, and the results are compared
and discussed. In section 6, different methods for evaluating
the acceptability of the proposed solutions are introduced, and
the stability of the solutions are examined. The paper concludes in section 7, with policy implications for sustainable
management of CPRs in cooperative frameworks.

2.

Cooperative CPR Management Institutions

[12] A CPR exploitation problem has been deﬁned by
Madani and Dinar [2012] as a pair (Q, R) where Q represents the vector of beneﬁciaries’ actual exploitations and R
is the total available (remaining) amount of CPR to be
exploited such that for beneﬁciaries i ¼ 1, 2, . . . , n: e ¼
n
X
(Q1, Q2, . . . , Qn)  0 and 0 
Qi  R. In this problem
i¼1

the beneﬁciaries’ actual utility is deﬁned as an n-tuple u ¼
(u1(Q1), u2(Q2), . . . , un(Qn)) where ui(Qi) is the utility of
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CPR beneﬁciary i from Qi. Beneﬁciaries’ expected utility
is deﬁned as an n-tuple Eu ¼ (Eu1(eQ1), Eu2(eQ2), . . . ,
Eun(eQn)) where eQi is beneﬁciary i’s expected amount
of exploitation from R and Eui(eQi) is the expected utility
n
X
eQi is greater or
of beneﬁciary i from eQi, such that
i¼1

smaller than R and Qi  eQi, and ui(Qi)  Eui(eQi) due to
the exploitation externalities which lower the availability
of the resource to the beneﬁciaries.
[13] An important characteristic of cooperative CPR
management is the perfect information on the part of each
beneﬁciary about the decisions and plans of other beneﬁciaries. In cooperative environments, CPR users may beneﬁt from adoption of various cooperative game theoretic
solutions, which result in higher gains for all beneﬁciaries
(ui  ui, where ui and ui are the utility of CPR beneﬁciary
i under cooperation and under the status quo, respectively).
When additional beneﬁt is achievable through cooperation,
the main challenge is to fairly and efﬁciently allocate it
among the cooperating parties. Such a challenge can be
addressed through allocating the gains from cooperation
using cooperative game theory concepts. An appropriate
allocation under cooperation should satisfy the following
constraints:
ui  ui

8i 2 N
(1)

ðindividual rationality conditionÞ
X

ui  ðsÞ

8s 2 S; S  N

i2s

(2)

ðgroup rationality conditionÞ
X

ui ¼ ðN Þ

i2N

(3)

ðefficiency conditionÞ

where for N ¼ {1, 2, . . ., n}, s is a feasible coalition (group
of collaborating beneﬁciaries) in the game, such that {i} (i
¼ 1, 2, . . ., n) are the noncooperative coalitions with single
beneﬁciaries and N is the grand coalition which includes all
beneﬁciaries ; S is the set of all feasible coalitions (all possible groups of beneﬁciaries) in the game; (s) is the value
of coalition s or the total obtainable beneﬁts by the members of coalition s; and (N) is the value of the grand
coalition.
[14] Each of the above equations reﬂects one important
condition, which should be satisﬁed by the ﬁnal cooperative
allocation solution. Equation (1) enforces the individual
rationality condition, requiring an allocation under cooperation to each beneﬁciary to be greater than what can be gained
individually under no cooperation. Equation (2) fulﬁlls the
group rationality condition, requiring the sum of cooperative
allocations to any group of beneﬁciaries to be greater that the
total obtainable beneﬁts under any coalition that includes
the same beneﬁciaries. Equation (3) enforces the joint efﬁciency condition, requiring that the total obtainable beneﬁts
under the grand coalition to be fully allocated to the members of that coalition. The system of equations (1) to (3)
establishes what is known as the core of the cooperative
game [Gillies, 1959], a set of game allocation gains that is
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not dominated by any other allocation set. The core of a
cooperative CPR management problem provides valuable
insights by suggesting the range of acceptable solutions for
each CPR beneﬁciary. The core includes an inﬁnite number
of cooperative solutions and provides a bound for the maximum beneﬁt allocation that each beneﬁciary may request
under cooperation. Satisfying the core conditions (equations
(1) to (3)) for a cooperative (allocation) solution is a necessary
condition for its acceptability by the players. Therefore, solutions not included in the core are also not acceptable and not
stable [Shapley, 1971]. Nevertheless, being included in the
core does not guarantee stability for a solution, as some users
may ﬁnd it unfair. Therefore, different methods are suggested
to ﬁnd the most stable and likely cooperative outcomes.
[15] The theoretical and empirical literature on cooperative game theory has introduced several solution concepts,
including the widely used core, Nash-Harsanyi, Shapley,
and nucleolus (which will be discussed and referenced
later), and solution concepts, such as the kernel [Davis and
Maschler, 1965], which is similar to the nucleolus but more
cumbersome to apply in empirical setting; the generalized
Shapley value [Loehman and Whinston, 1976], which refers
only to coalitions that are practically possible rather than
assigning equal probability to all possible coalitions from a
combinatorial point of view in the Shapley value; the 
value [Tijs, 1981], which is the marginal contribution of a
player to the grand coalition; and many others [see Parrachino et al., 2006]. We elected to calculate the core and
apply the Nash-Harsanyi, Shapley, and nucleolus solutions
mainly because they provide a unique solution that is in the
core when it does exist and also for a practical matter: that
these have been the most used solution concepts in natural
resource allocation problems analyzed in the literature.
[16] Below, we formulate cooperative CPR management
institutions, based on these three cooperative game theory
concepts that provide solutions that are in the core and are
potentially acceptable by the beneﬁciaries if the core is not
empty.
2.1. Nash-Harsanyi Institution
[17] When obtaining extra beneﬁts is possible through
cooperation, CPR beneﬁciaries can apply the Nash-Harsanyi
cooperative solution [Harsanyi, 1959, 1963], an extension of
Nash bargaining solution for a two-player bargaining game
[Nash, 1953]. To ﬁnd the Pareto-optimal beneﬁt allocation,
use the following mathematical model:
 ¼ max

n
Y

ðui  ui Þ

(4)

i¼1

subject to the core conditions (equations (1) to (3)), where
ui  ui is the gain of beneﬁciary i from cooperation and
n
X
ðui  ui Þ is the total beneﬁts obtained through cooperai¼1

tion by the group of players. The Nash-Harsanyi institution
provides a unique allocation solution that is included in the
core (if it is not empty) by maximizing the product of the
grand coalition members’ obtained beneﬁts from cooperation. Example applications of the Nash-Harsanyi bargaining solution in the water resources context include those of
Dinar and Howitt [1997], Dinar [2001], and Madani
[2011].
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2.2. Shapley Institution
[18] Allocation based on the Shapley solution [Shapley,
1953] is another method for fair and efﬁcient sharing of the
obtained beneﬁts under cooperation. Under this institution,
allocations are determined based on the weighted average
of the beneﬁciaries’ contributions to all possible coalitions
and sequences [Shapley, 1953], based on
ui ¼

X
SN
i2S

ðn  jsjÞ!ðjsj  1Þ!
ððsÞ  ðs  figÞÞ
n!

(5)

where for 8i 2 N : jsj is the number of members of coalition s, and n is the total number of beneﬁciaries in the allocation game. The Shapley solution is a unique solution that
is in the core of convex games. Example applications of the
Shapley concept in the water resources literature include
those of Young et al. [1982], Dinar et al. [1992], Lejano
and Davos [1995], Loehman [1995], and Dinar and Howitt
[1997].
2.3. Nucleolus Institution
[19] The CPR beneﬁciaries can allocate the obtained beneﬁts through cooperation based on the nucleolus solution
[Schmeidler, 1969], which minimizes the worst inequity or
dissatisfaction of the most dissatisﬁed coalition. The nucleolus of the beneﬁt allocation game can be determined by
ﬁnding " through the following optimization model:
max "

(6)

subject to
"

X

ui  ðsÞ

8s 2 S; S  N

i2s

(7)
Equation 3

where " is the maximum tax imposed on all coalitions to
keep them in the core. Solving the above mathematical model
provides a fair and efﬁcient allocation of beneﬁts to the CPR,
based on the nucleolus fairness principle [Schmeidler, 1969].
The nucleolus allocation is a single solution that is always in
the core, if the core is nonempty. Example applications of the
nucleolus solution in water resources management include
those of Suzuki and Nakayama [1976], Kilgour et al. [1988],
Lejano and Davos [1995], Loehman [1995], and Dinar and
Howitt [1997].
[20] We explain how the suggested cooperative management institutions can be applied in practice to CPR management problems by presenting a groundwater problem in
section 3.

3.

Groundwater Exploitation Problem

[21] Constituting 98% of total liquid freshwater of the
earth, providing 50% of potable water supplies, satisfying
40% of the demand of self-supplied industry, and supplying
20% of water use in irrigation [World Water Assessment
Programme, 2003], make groundwater one of the most precious natural CPRs. The current rate of global groundwater
withdrawals, about 750–800 km3 yr1 [Shah et al., 2000]
or about a quarter of total global water withdrawals [Shah
et al., 2004], which is in excess of natural groundwater
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recharge rate, has depleted groundwater resources. This has
resulted in declining water tables, decreasing yields of wells,
increasing pumping costs, competitive deepening of wells,
land subsidence, loss of wetlands and ﬂowing springs and
rivers, salt water intrusion and other salinity problems, water
quality degradation, and damaging aquatic ecosystems
[Konikow and Kendy, 2005; Villholth, 2006]. Such negative
effects are common in major regions of North Africa, the
Middle East, South and central Asia, North China, North
America, and Australia [Konikow and Kendy, 2005]. While
the value of this resource and the dramatic economic beneﬁts
are known, the complexity in regulating and monitoring
groundwater withdrawals have made sustainable management of this resource very challenging, making groundwater
one of the most studied CPRs in the literature [Blomquist,
1992; Burke et al., 1999; Chebaane et al., 2004; Gardner
et al., 1997; Gisser, 1980; Koundouri, 2004; Loaiciga,
2004; Provencher and Burt, 1993; Ross and MartinezSantos, 2009; Wegerich, 2006; Worthington et al., 1985].
The groundwater exploitation problem introduced by Madani
and Dinar [2012] is presented brieﬂy for application of cooperative CPR management institutions and a comparison of
the obtained results under the cooperative management institutions with those obtained under the noncooperative and exogenous groundwater management institutions by Madani
and Dinar [2011, 2012]. The groundwater exploitation problem is mathematically formulated as (more details about the
model are given by Madani and Dinar [2012]):
CP;h ¼ ðush þ v þ dh1 ÞQh
Ch ¼ CP;h þ CTech;h þ COther;x;h

(8)

(10)

2
Yx;h ¼ ðpx lx;h
þ qx lx;h ÞQh

(11)

Rh ¼

X

zx;h  Yx;h

Ph ¼ Rh  Ch

Z¼

sh ¼

Qh
ða ln th þ bÞ
4T

si;h ¼

n
X
Qj;h
Qi;h
ðaii ln th þ bii Þ þ
ðaij ln th þ bij Þ
4T
4T
j¼1

Ph  eh dh

(14)

0

where CP,h is the groundwater pumping cost at a given well
at time step h (for h ¼ 1, 2, . . ., H); Qh is the total discharge of the well at h; sh is the groundwater drawdown at
h; dh1 is the well water depth at the end of previous time
step; u and v are cost parameters ; CTech is a one-time initial
investment for irrigation technologies, represented by the
time step equivalent cost (CTech,h), e.g., annualized equivalent cost; COther,x,h is the cost of seeds, fertilizer, planting,
harvesting, etc. with regard to crop x at during h; Ch is the
total cost at h; lx,h is the area under irrigation for growing
crop x during h; ix, jx, and kx are cost parameters which
depend on the crop type (x); Yx,h is the total yield of crop x
in h; px and qx are yield parameters which depend on the

8ij

(16)

j6¼i

[24] In estimating the drawdown, using equation (15) or
(16), the net well discharges should be used which can be
calculated using the following equation:
n
X
j¼1
j6¼i

(12)

(13)

(15)

8

[23] When multiple (n) wells are present, equation (15)
fails to capture the mutual effects of extracted groundwater
from the neighboring wells (externalities). In that case the
actual drawdown at a g well i can be estimated using equation (16) [Loaiciga, 2004]. This equation also varies by ij
and coefﬁcients aii, bii, aij, and bij depend on the relative
locations of other wells ( j ¼ 1, 2, . . . , n) with respect to
well i.

Qi;h;Net ¼ Qi;h  ðQi;h;r þ i Qi;h þ

x

ZH

crop type (x); Rh is the revenue gained through selling
crops at the end of the growing season h; zx is the price per
weight unit of the crop x in h;  is time step–dependent discount rate; Ph is farmer’s proﬁt in h; Z is the total present
value of farmer’s proﬁt; and H is the length of the planning
horizon.
[22] The groundwater drawdown in a single well with discharge of Qh during time step h with a length th (e.g., hour,
week, month, and year) at distance  from the center of a
well can be approximated, using equation (15) [Loaiciga,
2004]. Equation (15) varies by  and given , aquifer transmissivity (T), and storativity, coefﬁcients a and b can be estimated by regression of this equation against the predicted
drawdown through the Theis equation for groundwater drawdown [Theis, 1935]:

(9)

2
þ jx lx;h þ kx
COther;x;h ¼ ix lx;h

W09553

!i;j Qj;h Þ þ Qei;h

(17)

where Qi is the pumped discharge of well i; Qi,r is the natural recharge of well i that includes the general natural
recharge of the aquifer (same recharge over the entire aquifer) as well as the local recharge (spatially variable) ; i is
the ratio of return ﬂow from water use on farm i to well i;
!i,j is the ratio of return ﬂow from water use on a farm j to
well i; and Qei is the evaporative losses of well i.
[25] Madani and Dinar [2012] developed a numerical
example to use the presented model under noncooperative
CPR management institutions. The same numerical example was used by Madani and Dinar [2011] to examine the
performance of regulatory exogenous CPR management
institution. Here, we also use the same numerical example
as a benchmark for comparing the performance of different
cooperative institutions for managing CPRs. The problem
includes three farmers, located on neighboring farms with
different areas, with lot A being the largest and lot C being
the smallest. Each farmer operates one well (i ¼ A, B, C),
tapping into the same inﬁnite aquifer. The wells have different initial water depths (or pumping costs) due to the
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Table 1. Values of Farmer-Dependent Parametersa
Parameter
Farmer
A
B
C

l (ha)

d0 (m)

aiA

aiB

aiC

biA

biB

biC

Qr (m3 yr1)



!i, A

40
28
15

20
14
9

9.125
5.423
3.640

5.423
9.125
6.684

3.640
6.684
9.125

140
100
50

100
140
115

50
115
140

1000
900
750

0.08
0.07
0.06

0.085
0.035

!i, B

!i, C

0

0
0

0.075

a

Madani and Dinar [2012].

slope of the farms, with well A having the maximum water
depth and well C having the minimum water depth. Each
farmer can choose from two crop options. Tables 1, 2,
and 3, respectively, present the values of farmer-dependent,
crop-dependent, and independent parameters of the numerical example.
[26] To underline the value of the introduced cooperative
CPR management institutions, these institutions are applied
next to the numerical example.

4.

The Social Planner Solution

[27] Before estimating the fair and efﬁcient shares of the
gains to the beneﬁciaries under cooperative management of
a CPR, there is a need to determine the total obtainable beneﬁt from cooperative management of the CPR during the
planning horizon. That can be done based on the social planner solution which maximizes the total beneﬁt received by
the beneﬁciaries from the CPR without a concern about how
to distribute the obtained beneﬁts among the beneﬁciaries.
The social planner solution for the numerical groundwater
example can be found based on the following mathematical
model:
max

X

Zi

(18)

i¼A; B; C

subject to equations (8)–(14), (16), (17), and
di; h ¼ si; h þ di; h1

(19)

where di,h is the well water depth for well i at the end of
time step h and si,h is the groundwater drawdown in well i,
calculated based on equation (16).
[28] The maximum obtainable beneﬁt (the net present
value of the beneﬁts from the entire planning horizon) for
the entire group of users, determined by the above optimization problem, needs to be allocated among the individual
members of the group, based on the introduced cooperative
game theory solution concepts. Cooperative game theory
solutions are expected to meet the fairness and efﬁciency
conditions (equations (1)–(3)). Based on the social planner
model (equations (18), (8)–(14), and (16)–(19)), the shares

of each beneﬁciary from the CPR during the 50 year
planning horizon of the example, are found to be ZA ¼
$4,394,518, ZB ¼ $0, and ZC ¼ $0 (all optimization problems have been solved using the What is Best commercial
optimization software of LINDO Systems Inc. in this study).
The results under the social planner solution suggest that
the maximum beneﬁt for the three farmers ($4,394,518) is
obtained when only farmer A farms on his land. In fact, the
model suggests that farmers B and C do not farm and do not
extract water from their wells, so the externalities’ effects
are minimized. Therefore, the water level in Well A is only
affected by the amount of water exploitation from this well
alone. Although farmer A is dealing with the highest vertical pumping depth (or the highest pumping costs), having
the largest land and economies of scale allows him to offset
the pumping costs and gain the highest possible beneﬁt for
the system.
[29] Under the transferrable utility assumption (side payments), the only challenge is to suggest how the three farmers can share the maximum obtainable beneﬁts in a fair and
efﬁcient manner. To be fair and efﬁcient, the suggested
allocation of the joint beneﬁts should be in the computed
core. The boundaries of the core can be calculated based on
equations (1)–(3). To do that, we apply the social planner
solution to all possible coalitions (except for the case of
full noncooperation). Table 4 presents the value of possible
coalitions with at least two members. To calculate the value
of coalitions with two members, based on the social planner
solution, two social planner models were developed. One
model includes the two farmers participating in the coalition and the other includes the one that is not cooperating.
By doing this, it is explicitly assumed that only in cases
which have two cooperating farmers and one noncooperating farmer, the latter develops his exploitation plan for the
whole planning horizon at the beginning, based on equation
(18) and using equation (15) instead of equation (16), even
if in the noncooperative mode this player might act differently. By using equation (15) in developing his long-term
exploitation plan the noncooperative farmer ends up ignoring the externalities caused by the exploitation plan that is
developed cooperatively by the other two farmers. This type
of planning matches the characteristics of the ‘‘variable ignorant nonmyopic management’’, [Madani and Dinar, 2012],

Table 2. Values of Crop-Dependent Parametersa
Parameter
Crop
1
2

q (t m3 ha1 yr1)

z ($ t1)

i ($ ha2 yr1)

j ($ ha1 yr1)

k ($ yr1)

p (t m3 ha2 yr1)

0.0256
0.0280

150
134

9.8175  103
9.8485  103

892.5
689.4

2.769
0.611

2.49  1010
7.51  1011

a

Madani and Dinar [2012].
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Table 3. Values of Independent Parametersa
A

B

tb

T (m2 d1)

u ($ m3 m1)

V ($ m3)

 (% yr1)

CTech ($)

Qei (m3 yr1)

H (years)

9.125

140

365

6960

7.2

10

0.05

0

0

50

a

Madani and Dinar [2012].
Note that t should be set equal to 365 in equations (1) and (2) to calculate the drawdown over one time step (h).

b

which may be used in the noncooperative mode by farmers
who develop long-term exploitation plans in absence of information on plans of other players. Similarly, the two cooperating farmers have no information on the externalities,
resulting from the exploitation plan of the noncooperating
farmer, when developing their long-term cooperative plan,
based on equation (18). In this case, the two collaborating
farmers use equation (16) (and not equation (15)) as a constraint in their planning model. Once the values of decision
variables of the two models have been determined through
the two models (two-farmer and one-farmer models), the
actual gains of the players can be estimated by simultaneous
consideration of the planning variables of the two models.
This will indeed allow capturing the externalities through
equations (16) and (17), which estimate the actual drawdown
in the wells of the cooperating and noncooperating farmers.
[30] It should be emphasized that here, we are explicitly
assuming that there is a public choice mechanism leading
to agreement over development of the exploitation management plan using the same method. The social planner solution for the grand coalition (three farmers as a group) is
developed based on the characteristics of the variable ignorant nonmyopic management, the same principles are used
to estimate the values in any case other than the full noncooperation case, in which all farmers act independently. In
other words, it is assumed that once there are at least two
parties who cooperate to develop their long-term exploitation plan based on the variable ignorant nonmyopic management institution, the other party will use the same
institution as a response strategy, no matter how he behaves
in the fully noncooperative case. Nevertheless, when no
party is willing to cooperate (the case of coalitions with
one member only), they are allowed to adopt different noncooperative management institutions. Perhaps future studies should consider the cases in which coalitions smaller
than the grand coalition may adopt different management
institutions for planning their exploitations. However, that
can make the problem highly complex, requiring a high
computational capacity. It is noteworthy that while the social
planning method used by the grand coalition matches the
variable ignorant nonmyopic management institution, the coalition members are not necessarily ignorant of externalities.
Table 4. The Values of Different Coalitional Settings Excluding
One-Member Coalitions
Gain Based on the Social
Planner Solution ($)
Coalition

Farmer A

Farmer B

{A, B}
{A, C}
{B, C}
{A, B, C}

3,742,295
2,682,139

21,014

4,394,518

1,459,786
0

Farmer C

Total Coalition
Value ($)

0
0
0

3,763,309
2,682,139
1,459,786
4,394,518

Indeed, since there is a member operating out of the grand
coalition there is no need for the coalition members to worry
about the externalities and variable ignorant nonmyopic management results in the highest level of beneﬁts for the grand
coalition. In this case, planning using the ‘‘smart ignorant nonmyopic management’’ institution which requires a continuous
update of the management plan after each time step would
yield the same result at a greater level of effort and cost.
[31] Since in case of full noncooperation (when all coalitions include one member only) noncooperating farmers may
adopt different management institutions for developing their
exploitation plans, coalitions with one member can have different values, based on the noncooperative management institution used by the only member of the coalition. The logic
behind considering a range of possible managerial characteristics/attitudes in the noncooperative environment, i.e., noncooperative management institutions, for the same users who
adopt a speciﬁc management institutions when acting together, i.e., the variable ignorant nonmyopic management, is
that the behavioral characteristics of a user in a group are not
necessarily the same when acting on his own. For example,
two thieves who have had a long-term business relationship
based on group rationality may prefer to make decisions
based on self-rationality when experiencing a prisoner’s dilemma situation. This is because parties change behaviors as
a result of the breakdown of a group, associated with loss of
trust, creation of a competitive environment, dominance of
free ride, etc., even if before the group’s breakdown their
decisions have been based on group rationality. On the other
hand, parties who compete for maximizing their beneﬁts
from a CPR with no consideration of the long-term feedback
of their decisions on their beneﬁts change attitudes and
become more considerate of the externalities and long-term
effects of their decisions when maximizing their joint longterm beneﬁts. What makes studying a range of noncooperative management institutions necessary is that noncooperative
parties can have different behavioral characteristics and adopt
different choices of noncooperative management institutions.
Similarly, in a prisoner’s dilemma game decision makers
may not be always free riders [Madani and Hipel, 2011].
Another important reason for considering the different noncooperative management institutions is that the different noncooperative behavioral characteristics of the farmers can have
considerable effects on the stability of the possible cooperative management institutions, as will be proved numerically
later in the paper.
[32] The values of one-member coalitions are given in
Table 5, which shows how the choice of noncooperative
management institutions, as described in Table 6, can affect
the realized beneﬁts of farmers over the planning period.
Generally, noncooperative farmers can increase their beneﬁts and prevent tragedy of the commons by replacing their
short-term (myopic) and aggressive exploitation plans that
fully ignore externalities (ignorant or egoistic behavior)
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Table 5. The Possible Values ($) of Different One-Member Coalitions Under Different Noncooperative Management Institutionsa
Noncooperative Management Institution

{A}
{B}
{C}
Sum

Ignorant Myopic
Management

Smart Myopic
Management With
Drawdown Penalty

Smart Myopic
Management With
Profit Penalty

Fixed Ignorant
Nonmyopic
Management

Variable Ignorant
Nonmyopic
Management

Smart Nonmyopic
Management

1,410,745
99,216
106,141
1,403,820

1,607,507
344,681
14,466
1,937,722

1,711,671
214,975
8,180
1918,466

2,199,330
790,681
70,617
3,060,627

2,209,329
744,047
40,259
2,993,636

2,410,089
918,662
167,173
3,495,924

a

Madani and Dinar [2012].

through (1) consideration of the externalities in their development plans (smart or altruistic behavior) and/or (2) development of long-term plans (nonmyopic behavior). Based
on smart noncooperative institutions the effects of externalities are considered in developing the management plan
through different heuristics such as self-imposed penalties
(e.g., assuming that the actual drawdown will be higher
than what is expected, or the obtained proﬁt will be less
than what is planned) or continuous revision of the exploitation plan over time based on the latest available information
about the status of the CPR. Nonmyopic noncooperative
institutions are based on maximizing the long-term beneﬁts
as opposed to the short-term beneﬁts, as done in the myopic
management institutions. The highest beneﬁts are realized
by the noncooperative farmers when the applied management institution is nonmyopic and smart. On the other hand,
lower beneﬁts are obtained when the exploitation plans lack
both or one of the two characteristics. Such plans can even
result in considerable losses (negative proﬁt) for some farmers who start farming with proﬁt expectation, but end up
with costs higher than revenues due to the externalities,
ignored in their management plans [Madani and Dinar,
2012]. Comparing the values in the last row of Table 5 with
the social planner solution of the problem shows that
depending on the noncooperative management institution
used by the farmers, cooperation of three farmers can result
in an extra beneﬁt of $898,594 to $2,990,698, which should
be allocated to the three farmers, based on the introduced
cooperative management institutions.
[33] The values given in Tables 4 and 5 allow calculating
the boundaries of the core, based on equations (1)–(3), in

order to ﬁnd the farmers’ preference orders over the possible cooperative solutions. Using an example, the procedure
for ﬁnding the boundaries of the core and calculating the
extreme points of the core are illustrated in Appendix A.
Finding the extreme points helps us ﬁnd the minimum and
maximum beneﬁts that each player can expect from participating in the grand coalition. Figure 1 indicates the minimum and maximum expected beneﬁts of the three farmers
when they use various types of noncooperative management institutions in the status quo (under noncooperation).
The obtained values indicate that as farmers become less
myopic by replacing their short-term plans with long-term
ones, and less ignorant by developing exploitation plans
that consider the externalities, the solution space (core)
becomes smaller. This can be explained by the fact that the
incremental beneﬁt of cooperation decreases as farmers get
smarter and more considerate.

5. Cooperative Groundwater Management
Results
[34] The results based on the social planner solution suggest that cooperative groundwater management institutions
can provide the highest beneﬁt to the farmers in comparison with noncooperative and exogenous groundwater management institutions. Results of Madani and Dinar [2012]
indicate that within a noncooperative management framework where farmers may beneﬁt from various noncooperative CPR management institution options (Table 6),
farmers can increase their total gain up to 149% by replacing myopic ignorant exploitation plans with nonmyopic

Table 6. Noncooperative Groundwater Management Institutions
Name

Descriptiona

Ignorant myopic management
Smart myopic management with
drawdown penalty

User develops a short-term plan with no consideration of externalities.
User develops a short-term plan and tries to consider the externalities based on his past experience regarding
groundwater drawdown. This user assumes that the actual drawdown will be x units higher than the expected
drawdown, where x is equal to the average difference between the expected and actual drawdown in previous
time steps.
User develops a short-term plan and tries to consider the externalities based on his past experience regarding
obtained proﬁt. This user assumes that the actual proﬁt will be y units higher than the expected proﬁt, where
y is equal to the average difference between the expected and actual proﬁt in previous time steps.
User develops a plan with ﬁxed decision variables for a long term with no consideration of the externalities.
The operation variables of this user (e.g., groundwater withdrawal, area under cultivation, crop type, etc.) do
not change across time steps.
User develops a plan with variable decision variables for a long term with no consideration of the externalities.
The operation variables of this user can vary across time steps.
User develops a long-term plan with variable decision variables and tries to consider the externalities by
continuous revision of the long-term plan.

Smart myopic management with
proﬁt penalty
Fixed ignorant nonmyopic
management
Variable ignorant nonmyopic
management
Smart nonmyopic management
a

For comprehensive description of these institutions, readers are referred to Madani and Dinar [2012].
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Figure 1. The minimum (Min) and maximum (Max) expected beneﬁts of (a) farmer A, (b) farmer B,
(c) farmer C using various types of noncooperative management institutions in the case of noncooperation (status quo) and the allocated beneﬁts to the farmers based on various cooperative management
institutions (N-H ¼ Nash-Harsanyi, Sh ¼ Shapley, and N ¼ nucleolus).
smart exploitation plans. Madani and Dinar [2011] found
that by interference of a regulator through some commonly
used exogenous regulatory groundwater management institutions the total gain of the myopic ignorant farmers may
rise by up to 138%. This indicates that long-term planning
and consideration of the externalities by the farmers may be
more efﬁcient than interference of the regulators through
some commonly used exogenous regulatory management
practices, suffering from imperfect information at the design
stage and high transaction costs. Here, the results based on
the social planner solution show that through cooperation
the total gain of the noncooperating farmers may increase
by 213%. This suggests that cooperative management institutions are the most efﬁcient institutions in increasing the
gain to the CPR beneﬁciaries and prolonging the CPR’s life
in comparison with noncooperative and exogenous CPR
management institutions. Nevertheless, the given number
(213%) may be too optimistic, as the transaction costs of
establishing cooperative management institutions have not
been considered here.
[35] Given the values of Tables 4 and 5, we can calculate
the gain to each farmer, based on different cooperative allocation institutions introduced earlier. Figure 1 shows the
allocated beneﬁts to the three cooperating farmers, based on

different cooperative institutions. The cooperative shares of
the farmers vary, based on the noncooperative institution
they choose in case of noncooperation (status quo). All cooperative solutions based on the three suggested institutions
satisfy the core requirements (equations (A1) to (A7)).
Therefore, they are in the core and are acceptable by the
users. However, the level of acceptability and stability of
the allocated beneﬁts may vary among the users, as will be
discussed in section 6. Considering the computational limitation only cases in which all farmers apply the same management institution have been examined here (public choice
mechanism as explained earlier).
[36] According to Figure 1, farmer C, the smallest farmer
(poorest in terms of land resources), is the one who beneﬁts
the most from cooperation with respect to what he could
gain noncooperatively. The opposite is true for farmer A, the
largest farmer (richest in terms of land resources). Generally,
as users become less myopic by developing long-term plans
and less ignorant by considering the externalities, their relative beneﬁt from cooperation decreases. Therefore, the ignorant myopic farmers beneﬁt the most and smart nonmyopic
farmers beneﬁt the least from cooperation with respect to the
status quo. That may suggest that ignorant myopic farmers
have higher desire to cooperate than farmers who plan long
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term and/or consider the externalities in the exploitation
plans. Yet, in practice, the ignorant myopic farmers may be
reluctant to cooperate, as they cannot perceive the long-term
beneﬁts. Therefore, enforcing cooperation may be more convenient when parties are considerate of the externalities and
long-term beneﬁts.
[37] Comparison of the results suggests that in most
cases farmer C (the smallest farmer) gains less under the
Shapley institution than under the Nash-Harsanyi institution. The opposite is true for farmer B, who is not as large
as farmer A and not as small as farmer C. The reason for
that result lies in the calculation of the Shapley and NashHarsanyi institutions. In the case of Nash-Harsanyi, each
farmer gets an equal incremental gain based on its original
beneﬁt at the status quo; however, the Shapley institution
allocates incremental gains to each farmer based on their
average contribution to the coalition when they enter that coalition. In this case, when entering the coalition, farmer B
has more contribution than farmer C. Thus, farmer B’s coalitional gains are higher. Gains of farmer A do not differ signiﬁcantly under the Nash-Harsanyi and Shapley institutions.
[38] When comparing the gain of the smallest farmer,
farmer C, under different cooperative management institutions, one can ﬁnd that this farmer gains the least under the
nucleolus institution. On the other hand, farmer B, with the
middle wealth level, gains the most under this institution in
comparison with what he gains under the other two institutions (the nucleolus calculation procedure suggests that it
would take the lowest " to keep a coalition with C in the
core and a higher " to keep a coalition with B in the core).
Gain of the largest farmer, farmer A, under the nucleolus
institution does not have a signiﬁcant difference with his
gains under the other two institutions in most cases.
[39] The results under the three cooperative management
institutions rely on an important assumption. Here, it is
assumed that utility is transferrable and side payments are
allowed. Therefore, in case of cooperation, it is suggested
that only farmer A, with the lower production cost per unit,
farms on his land and shares the beneﬁts with the other two
farmers. In this case, the three farmers can enjoy a lower
depth to groundwater (a longer CPR life) due to minimization of the externalities caused by simultaneous pumping in
all the wells. Nevertheless, the solution may be associated
with some transaction costs. When utility is not transferrable and side payments are not allowed, the problem ﬁnds a
different structure. While cooperation may still result in
higher beneﬁts and prolong the CPR’s life, the maximum
total beneﬁts obtained will be lower than a case with side
payments. In that case, farmers would cooperate by lowering their pumping rates to prolong the groundwater resource’s life and keeping pumping costs lower than the beneﬁts
obtained from crop production. Therefore, all farmers will
farm on their lands while they are enjoying lower groundwater depths ; however, some transactions costs associated
with monitoring and enforcement may be experienced.
This case is not studied here. Nonetheless, the gains of the
farmers under the cooperation can be calculated using the
same concepts. For example, the farmers’ gains from cooperation based on the Nash-Harsanyi institution can be calculated using the Nash-Harsanyi bargaining solution for
linked games [Madani, 2011]. In that case, farmers see the
game as interconnection of H (here H ¼ 50) games linked
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to each other. Therefore, the ‘‘strategic loss’’ becomes possible and farmers are willing to strategically lose in some years
(in some subgames) to increase their gain (win) in the overall
interconnected game. By beneﬁting from strategic loss, the
feasible solution space is expanded and parties can develop
cooperative solutions that increase the gains to all parties.

6. Acceptability and Stability of the Cooperative
Institutions
[40] To ensure that a cooperative solution works properly in practice, not only should it be in the core, but also it
has to be stable. While being in the core is a necessary condition for acceptability of a cooperative solution by the
beneﬁciaries, not all solutions contained in the core are acceptable. Some solutions that fulﬁll the core requirements
are found unfair by some beneﬁciaries, making them unacceptable and unstable. When beneﬁciaries ﬁnd a solution
unfair, they may threaten to leave the grand coalition to
form subcoalitions or to act on their own, due to their critical role in the coalition [Dinar and Howitt, 1997].
[41] When multiple cooperative solutions are available,
one simple method to ﬁnd which solution is superior to
others is using the plurality rule ﬁnding which method is
the most preferred option by the most number of users. The
plurality rule is perhaps the most common method for ﬁnding the socially optimal solution. Other socially optimal
rules (e.g., Condorcet choice, Borda scoring, median voting
rule, majoritarian compromise, and Condorcet’s practical
method) can be used in similar situations when multiple
users have a chance to select a best alternative. Fallback
bargaining methods [Brams and Kilgour, 2001] can be also
used to ﬁnd the optimal alternative in these situations. See
Sheikhmohammady and Madani [2008] for explanation and
example applications of various social rules and fallback bargaining methods. Table 7 indicates how the various cooperative management institutions in the numerical example are
ranked from 1 (worst option) to 3 (best option) by the farmers
using the plurality rule. As indicated in Table 7, the ranking
orders of the farmers over the possible alternatives vary,
depending on the noncooperative management institution
they will adopt in the status quo. The plurality rule selects the
option considered best by the highest number of users as the
socially optimal alternative. The last row of Table 7 indicates which cooperative management institution is selected,
based on the plurality rule, depending on the users’ behavioral characteristics in the noncooperative case. Results indicate that the Shapley institution is never selected. Therefore,
this institution cannot provide stable solutions to enforce
cooperation among the three farmers. Based on Table 7, the
nucleolus institution is most preferred by the majority of the
farmers when they are myopic. When they consider their
long-term beneﬁts under noncooperation, the Nash-Haryanvi
institution is preferred by the majority. Since the selected alternative, based on the plurality rule, always complies with
the best choice of farmer A, who has the highest level of
power due to his highest wealth level, it is reasonable to
expect the plurality rule’s selected option to be stable in
practice.
[42] The choice of cooperative institutions can vary
based on the conditions of the problem. The Nash-Harsanyi
cooperative institution may not be appropriate for all
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Table 7. Preference Orders of the Farmers Over the Cooperative Management Institutions Based on Their Noncooperative
Characteristicsa
Noncooperative Management Institution

Cooperative
Management
Institution

Ignorant
Myopic
Management

Smart Myopic
Management
With Drawdown
Penalty

Smart Myopic
Management
With Profit
Penalty

Fixed Ignorant
Nonmyopic
Management

Variable
Ignorant
Nonmyopic
Management

Smart
Nonmyopic
Management

2
1
3
1
2
3
3
2
1
Nucleolus

1
2
3
1
2
3
3
2
1
Nucleolus

2
1
3
1
2
3
3
2
1
Nucleolus

3
2
1
1
2
3
3
2
1
Nash-Harsanyi

3
2
1
1
2
3
3
2
1
Nash-Harsanyi

3
2
1
1
2
3
3
2
1
Nash-Harsanyi

Farmer A

Nash-Harsanyi
Shapley
Nucleolus
Farmer B
Nash-Harsanyi
Shapley
Nucleolus
Farmer C
Nash-Harsanyi
Shapley
Nucleolus
Selected institution based on the plurality rule
a

Note that 3 and 1 indicate the most and least preferred options, respectively.

problems as it sometimes may provide unfair allocations,
especially if there are big utility differences between the
users (e.g., very rich and very poor beneﬁciaries) [Dinar
and Howitt, 1997].
[43] While plurality rule is a simple method for determining the most stable cooperative solution, due to its qualitative nature, it fails to provide some useful quantitative
information about the stability of the solutions available
through application of other stability measurement methods. Propensity to disrupt player i (PTDi), the ratio of how
much the other beneﬁciaries would lose if player i leaves
the grand coalition and refuses to cooperate to how much
he would lose if he refuses to cooperate, has been suggested
as an indicator of players’ powers in a cooperative framework [Gately, 1974; Strafﬁn and Heaney, 1981]:
X
PTDi ¼

uj  ðN  iÞ
(20)

j6¼i

ui  ðiÞ

[44] The lower the ratio for a given player, the higher
his enthusiasm for cooperating and staying in the grand

coalition. The user who has a high enthusiasm for cooperation has a low power in the grand coalition. On the other
hand, a player with a high propensity to disrupt has a high
power in the grand coalition, using his high contribution to
the grand coaltionas a basis for a credible threat to the other
members of the grand coalition. This player threatens to
leave the grand coalition to create subcoalitions or act on
his own, asking for more beneﬁts out of cooperation.
[45] Table 8 presents the calculated propensity to disrupt
of the farmers for different cooperative solutions, which
vary based on their choice of noncooperative management
institution in status quo. The values in Table 8 suggest that
the propensity to disrupt under a given cooperative management institution increases as they become less myopic
and less ignorant. This is due to the fact that by long-term
planning and consideration of the externalities farmers can
increase their gains even without cooperation. That also
underlines the value of information. Parties who are aware
of the externalities’ effects and are concerned about the
CPR’s conditions in the long run have more power when it
comes to cooperation.
[46] The value of 0 propensity to disrupt for a myopic
farmer C under the Nash-Harsanyi cooperative institution

Table 8. Propensity to Disrupt of the Farmers Under Different Cooperative Management Institutions Based on Their Choice of
Management Institution in the Status Quo
Noncooperative Management Institution

Cooperative
Management
Institution
Nash-Harsanyi
Farmer A
Farmer B
Farmer C
Shapley
Farmer A
Farmer B
Farmer C
Nucleolus
Farmer A
Farmer B
Farmer C

Ignorant Myopic
Management

Smart Myopic
Management With
Drawdown Penalty

Smart Myopic
Management
With Profit Penalty

Fixed Ignorant
Nonmyopic
Management

Variable
Ignorant
Nonmyopic
Management

Smart
Nonmyopic
Management

0.35
0.43
0.00

0.47
0.51
0.00

0.33
0.63
0.00

0.65
1.07
0.26

0.55
1.07
0.27

0.75
1.65
0.55

0.37
0.39
0.02

0.43
0.45
0.10

0.39
0.48
0.09

0.66
0.72
0.58

0.62
0.70
0.55

0.98
0.99
0.98

0.11
0.21
0.88

0.11
0.21
0.88

0.11
0.21
0.88

0.12
0.20
0.80

0.11
0.21
0.88

0.11
0.27
0.58
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(Table 8) suggests that this farmer has a very high enthusiasm to stay in the grand coalition as the other players will
not lose without him. In such a situation, this farmer may
be willing to bribe the other farmers by increasing their
gains and asking for less beneﬁt out of the joint cooperative
gains. Although by doing this farmer C ends up with lower
cooperative gains, he can create an incentive for the other
players to stay in the grand coalition. Therefore, when the
players act myopically in status quo, a cooperative solution
close to what was suggested by the Nash-Harsanyi institution may be stable. However, given the high propensity to
disrupt farmer B under this institution, it may be concluded
that when farmers become nonmyopic the Nash-Harsanyi
cooperative solution cannot be stable anymore. For myopic
farmers, the Shapley institution seems a fair scheme for
allocating gains with the lowest maximum propensity to
disrupt. However, this institution cannot provide stable solutions for smart nonmyopic farmers, as was discussed earlier. Given that farmers A and B are wealthier and more
valuable to the grand coalition than farmer C, it is reasonable to conclude that cooperative solutions in which farmers
A and B have lower propensity to disrupt are more stable.
In that case, the nucleolus seems to be the best institution
for allocating the cooperation beneﬁts.
[47] Calculating the power index of player i (i) in the
cooperative game is another method for evaluating the stability of the cooperative solution [Loehman et al., 1979;
Shapley and Shubik, 1954]:
n
X
ui  ðiÞ
i ¼ X
i ¼ 1
;
n
ðuj  ðjÞÞ i¼1

(21)

j¼1

[48] Based on this concept, to determine if a solution is
stable, the power index of each player is calculated based
on the given cooperative solution. The higher the power
index of a player is, the higher that player’s enthusiasm is
for cooperating and staying in the grand coalition. This
method suggests that if the power is distributed more or
less equally among the players, then the solution is more
likely to be stable [Dinar and Howitt, 1997]. Looking at
the coefﬁcient of variations of power indices, known as
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stability index (), one can ﬁnd if the power distribution is
equally distributed among the users. The lower the stability
index, the more stable the cooperative solution.
[49] Table 9 shows the calculated power indices of the
farmers and stability index of each cooperative solution for
different cooperative solutions, which vary based on their
choice of noncooperative management institution in status
quo. Based on the results, Nash-Harsanyi cooperative institution seems to have the best performance in distributing
the powers equally among the farmers of the numerical
example. Although, the nucleolus institution fails to distribute the powers equally among the farmers, given the conditions of the problem, it may provide a stable solution as it
gives higher powers to the wealthier (larger) farmers, so it
allows them to remain in the coalition and inﬂuence the
poorer (smaller) ones.
[50] Figure 2 indicates the stability index of each cooperative solution, which varies based on farmers’ choice of
noncooperative management institution in the status quo.
Based on the results, Nash-Harsanyi institution shows the
best performance (lower stability indices) for all status quo’s
noncooperative behavior types. The opposite is true for the
nucleolus institution. The performance of the Shapley institution is almost insensitive to the noncooperative behaviors
of the farmers in status quo. As the users become less myopic and smarter, stability index gets smaller under NashHarsanyi institution, indicating the possibility of developing
stable solutions under this institution for farmers with better
behaviors.

7.

Conclusions and Policy Implications

[51] Users of common pool resources can develop exploitation plans based on various cooperative management
institutions. Comparison of the results of this study with
previous studies, using noncooperative and exogenously
imposed regulations suggests that cooperative management
institutions are the most efﬁcient methods in prolonging the
CPR’s life and increasing the long-term beneﬁts to its
users. However, adopting these institutions in practice may
be more challenging than the other two categories of institutions, due to their rigorous mathematical nature as well as

Table 9. Power Indices of the Farmers Under Different Cooperative Management Institutions Based on Their Choice of Management
Institution in the Status Quo
Noncooperative Management Institution
Cooperative
Management
Institution
Nash-Harsanyi
Farmer A
Farmer B
Farmer C
Shapley
Farmer A
Farmer B
Farmer C
Nucleolus
Farmer A
Farmer B
Farmer C

Ignorant Myopic
Management

Smart Myopic
Management With
Drawdown Penalty

Smart Myopic
Management With
Profit Penalty

Fixed Ignorant
Nonmyopic
Management

Variable Ignorant
Nonmyopic
Management

Smart Nonmyopic
Management

0.38
0.38
0.25

0.37
0.37
0.26

0.37
0.37
0.26

0.33
0.33
0.33

0.33
0.33
0.33

0.33
0.33
0.33

0.37
0.39
0.24

0.38
0.39
0.24

0.35
0.41
0.24

0.33
0.40
0.27

0.32
0.41
0.27

0.29
0.44
0.26

0.41
0.44
0.15

0.42
0.44
0.14

0.37
0.49
0.14

0.31
0.48
0.21

0.31
0.48
0.21

0.26
0.48
0.26
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Figure 2. Stability indices under different cooperative management institutions based on farmers’
choice of management institution in the status quo.

lack of trust among the users, limited information and
knowledge, presence of many users, etc. While implementation of cooperative institutions may be challenging in
practice, governments can help enforce these institutions
by creating different incentives for cooperation (e.g., tax
write-off, development loans, monitoring mechanisms, and
technical advice).
[52] The maximum obtainable beneﬁt by the CPR users
can be calculated using a social plannner solution. Yet, this
approach cannot suggest stable and acceptable cooperative
solutions because it ignores what each individual will incrementally gain under cooperation. Therefore, cooperative
game theory allocation solutions such as the core, NashHarsanyi, Shapley, and nucleolus can be applied to determine
efﬁcient and fair allocation solutions that are acceptable by
the users. These methods consider the contribution of each
CPR beneﬁciary to the grand coalition, and their gains in case
of noncooperation and suggest solutions that minimize the
users’ incentives to leave the grand coalition to act on their
own or form subcoalitions with other users.
[53] As indicated using the numerical example, application of the plurality rule or measurement of stability through
calculation of the propensity to disrupt, power index, and
stability index may not necessary lead to an accurate prediction of the most stable and likely outcome. Nonetheless,
these methods are helpful in ﬁnding the highly unstable
outcomes. To better suggest a stable outcome, one should
consider the conditions of the problem, and various factors
that may affect the stability of a solution in practice (e.g.,
powers of the parties in allocating more resources to them),
and transactions costs.
[54] It is also important to note that the ﬁnal cooperative
solution does not always match the values suggested by the
introduced cooperative management institutions. However,
with the knowledge of propensity to disrupt values and
power indices, and more information about the problem’s
conditions in practice, it is possible to develop a stable solution by tweaking the solutions suggested by the cooperative management institutions. In fact, these institutions can
suggest solutions that are close to what will eventually be
found stable and fair by the parties in practice. Therefore,
they are helpful in suggesting suboptimal solutions for

initiating the bargaining process over the gains out of
cooperation.
[55] Results of the study show that as users become less
myopic and less ignorant, they beneﬁt less from cooperation with respect to what they gain under noncooperation.
Also, the ranges of acceptable solutions by the users get
more limited as they become more considerate of the externalities and long-term beneﬁts from the CPR, resulting in a
smaller core. Thus, the acceptable cooperative solutions are
more limited for nonmyopic smart users and result in
higher propensities to disrupt for these users. While potentially this results in hardship in enforcing cooperative solutions among this type of users, due to a better knowledge
about the externalities and long-term beneﬁts, theoretically,
developing practical cooperative solutions among these
users should be easier than for myopic ignorant users who
are more focused on immediate beneﬁts from the resource.
Nevertheless, when transaction costs of enforcing cooperation are high, regulators may seek a sustainable use of the
CPR through educating the users to replace their myopic
ignorant behavior with nonmyopic smart behavior.

Appendix A: Extreme Points of the Core
[56] As an example, the core equations for cooperation of
farmers who use variable ignorant nonmyopic management
under noncooperation can be written as follows:
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uA  2;209;329

(A1)

uB  744;047

(A2)

uC  40;259

(A3)

uA þ uB  3;763;309

(A4)

uA þ uC  2;682;139

(A5)

uB þ uC  1;459;786

(A6)

uA þ uB þ uC ¼ 4;394;518

(A7)
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Table A1. Extreme Points of the Core for the Farmers Who Use
Variable Ignorant Nonmyopic Management Under Noncooperation
Maximum Incremental Benefit Allocation
of Farmer i, i ¼ A, B, C
A

B

C

Grand Coalition
Formation Sequence

2,209,329
2,209,329
3,019,262
2,934,732
2,641,880
2,934,732

1,553,980
1,712,378
744,047
744,047
1,712,378
1,419,527

631,209
472,810
631,209
715,739
40,259
40,259

ABC
ACB
BAC
BCA
CAB
CBA

[57] The above set of inequalities suggests a range of solutions that may be acceptable by the three farmers in case of
cooperation when each uses the variable ignorant nonmyopic
management under noncooperation. Based on these equations, it is possible to calculate the extreme points of the core
[Shapley, 1971] to ﬁnd the ordering of the farmers’ preferences over the possible cooperative solutions [Dinar and
Howitt, 1997]. To do so, we should consider all the possible
sequences for formation of the grand coalition. Table A1
shows such sequences together with the extreme points of
the core for the farmers who use variable ignorant nonmyopic management under noncooperation, based on the
values of Tables 4 and 5.
[58] The extreme points of the core and the incremental
beneﬁt allocation of the farmers, adopting the variable ignorant nonmyopic management institution, are calculated as
follows: As an example for the grand coalition sequence
ABC, it is assumed that ﬁrst farmer A joins the empty coalition with a zero value and creates coalition {A} with associated value of $2,209,329. Then farmer B joins the coalition
and creates coalition {A, B} with the value of $3,763,309
(given in Table 5). Therefore, the contribution of farmer B to
the new coalition is $3,763,309  $2,209,329 ¼ $1,553,980,
which is the maximum beneﬁt he can expect to obtain from
cooperating with farmer A. By joining farmer C to this coalition, the grand coalition {A, B, C} is created with total worth
of $4,394,518. The contribution of farmer C to the grand coalition with the ABC sequence is $4,394,518  $3,763,309
¼ $631,209, which is the maximum he can expect from participating in the grand coalition, when he is the last one to
join. The values, given in Table A1, show the incremental
contributions of the farmers to different sequential formations of the grand coalition. In fact, these numbers indicate
the minimum and maximum expected beneﬁt allocation of
the farmers, or the farmers’ preference orders over the possible allocation. For instance, farmer A prefers allocations
under which he can gain a proﬁt close to $3,019,262 (the
highest number in farmer A’s column in Table A1) to allocations under which his gain is close to $2,209,329 (the lowest
number in farmer A’s column in Table A1). This farmer
does not accept any allocation scheme that provides him less
than $2,209,329.
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